Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 83
Issue 4 Symposium: Separation of Powers as a
Safeguard of Federalism
5-1-2008

Framework Legislation and Federalism
Elizabeth Garrett

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth Garrett, Framework Legislation and Federalism, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1495 (2008).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol83/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

Article 4

FRAMEWORK LEGISLATION AND FEDERALISM
Elizabeth Garrett*
INTRODUCTION

In Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism,I Bradford Clark
identifies the Supremacy Clause as a powerful protection of principles
of federalism because it allows federal action only if the "precise procedures" for lawmaking are followed. 2 He describes the requirements
of bicameralism, presentment, and, in the case of some federal
actions, supermajority votes. 3 He also emphasizes the Senate's role in
policymaking. 4 The Senate historically has been the arena in which
states have significant influence; although that influence has
decreased after passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, the rule of
equal representation of states in that body continues. Throughout
the article, Professor Clark quotes the Supreme Court's description of
the constitutional procedures governing lawmaking as "'finely
wrought and exhaustively considered.' "5
The Constitution's mandates with respect to congressional procedures, however, are also relatively sparse; most of the procedures governing lawmaking in the House and Senate are part of the internal
rules of each body, adopted pursuant to Article I, Section 5 of the
© 2008 Elizabeth Garrett. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
*
Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, Political
Science, and Policy, Planning, and Development, University of Southern California;
Co-Director, USC-Caltech Center for the Study of Law and Politics. I appreciate
helpful comments from Scott Altman, Richard Briffault, Aaron Bruhl, Michael Kang,
Anita Krishnakumar, Theresa Gullo, Hans Linde, Andrei Marmor, Mat McCubbins,
Bob Rasmussen, and Adrian Vermeule, and the excellent research assistance of Derek
Lazzaro (USC '09).
1 Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REv. 1321 (2001).
2 Id. at 1321.
3 See id. at 1328-32.
4 See id. at 1357-67.
5 Id. passim (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
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Constitution-the Rules of Proceeding Clause. 6 No analysis of the
"finely wrought" procedures of lawmaking is complete without an
assessment of these additional requirements. Moreover, the adoption
of framework laws and other internal rules suggests that other safeguards may evolve within the legislative arena in addition to the constitutional procedures Clark relies on to protect federalism. 7 Finally,
even if Clark's conclusion that courts should vigorously enforce constitutional procedures is correct, similarly aggressive judicial enforcement of framework laws is not necessarily justified and might be
counterproductive.
Congress can add to constitutionally mandated procedures with
respect to all laws (e.g., the filibuster rules in the Senate, the Rules
Committee in the House, the committee structure in both houses),
and it can enact more targeted rules that apply only to a subset of
legislative proposals. With respect to the latter, Congress sometimes
adopts such targeted rules as part of statutes, or framework laws,
which establish internal procedures that will shape legislative deliberation and voting on certain decisions in the future.8 In one area that
affects the relationship between the federal government and the
states-the enactment of unfunded mandates that burden states and
localities-Congress has adopted a framework law: the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA). 9 UMRA has been in effect
for over a decade and is an integral part of the procedural environment shaping congressional consideration of certain proposals implicating federalism. In general, UMRA increases the hurdles, in both
the House and Senate, to enactment of new unfunded mandates.
Although its provisions are not constitutionally required, they are part
of the "finely wrought" process through which proposals imposing
certain intergovernmental mandates become laws.
6 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
7 The constitutional procedures relating to separation of powers that Clark relies
on to protect federalism actually work to entrench the status quo, rather than to target principles of federalism. If the status quo already includes laws that are detrimental to strong state governments, then the "finely wrought and exhaustively
considered" procedures will make it more difficult to repeal those statutes and reach
a more balanced arrangement. To put it another way, the status quo that the constitutional procedures protected 200 years ago is a very different one in terms of federalism than the status quo protected in the twenty-first century. See Carlos Manuel
Vdzquez, The Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Nationalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1601, 1606-07 (2008) (making a similar point).
8 See Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framewvork Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 717, 733-64 (2005).
9 Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
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In this Article, I will use the theoretical work on framework laws I
have developed elsewhere' to assess UMRA. In Part I, I will briefly
describe UMRA and relate it to the congressional budget process
framework, of which UMRA is part. In Part II, I will determine which
of the purposes of framework laws UMRA serves, concluding that it
serves, to greater or lesser extent, four purposes. It provides a symbolic response to an issue made salient in the early 1990s; it provides a
solution to collective action problems often encountered by multimember legislatures, particularly as it provides information to
lawmakers about the scope of proposed unfunded mandates; it is a
precommitment and entrenchment device to make it harder for Congress to pass unfunded mandates imposing costs above a certain
threshold; and it shifts power away from committees to individual
members and to congressional party leaders.
Finally, in Part III, I will identify and discuss two of the challenges
facing framework laws designed to further the values of federalism.
First, any framework law, including those dealing with federalism,
must define ex ante the universe of future proposals to which it will
apply. That is part of the explanation for UMRA's narrow targeting of
unfunded intergovernmental mandates.
Other federalism
frameworks could aim at different, relatively concrete problems, such
as conditions of assistance or preemption. This ability to target a particular set of laws differentiates framework law protection from the
constitutional protection Clark describes; constitutional separation of
powers principles apply to any laws adopted by Congress, those that
further federalism principles as well as those that undermine them.
Second, the role that a framework law like UMRA should play in judicial review is unsettled. Just as Professor Clark would advocate for
aggressive judicial review to ensure that the constitutional requirements of lawmaking are followed, courts could police Congress'
adherence to its own internal rules, especially those passed in statutized form." Indeed, there might be some cases, likely very rare
instances, where Congress would prefer judicial review to strengthen
the force of a framework law. I conclude, however, with skepticism
10

See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Conditionsfor Framework Legislation, in THE LEAST
294, 297-318 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006)
[hereinafter Garrett, Conditions] (specifying conditions that Congress must consider
before enacting framework laws); Garrett, supra note 8, at 724 (identifying specific
examples of framework laws and describing the purposes served by framework
legislation).
11 See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment,
Separation of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345, 346 (2003)
(referring to framework laws as "statutized rules").
EXAMINED BRANCH
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about judicial review of compliance with framework laws. Not only
would it likely lead to a congressional response to avoid judicial review
in many cases-perhaps reducing the use of framework laws generally-but courts would also find it challenging to discern whether
lawmakers had complied with internal rules in any particular decision.
I.

THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT OF

1995

In the 1990s, the intergovernmental lobby placed the issue of
unfunded federal mandates on the national agenda. 12 In March 1995
Congress passed, and President Clinton signed, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act which established a procedural framework to shape
congressional deliberations concerning certain unfunded mandates
(Title )13 and required administrative agencies to assess the effects of
any major regulation imposing an intergovernmental mandate (Title
II). 14 Throughout this Article, I will focus primarily on Title I, "Legislative Accountability and Reform"; Title II's "Regulatory Accountability and Reform" is not relevant to this analysis. 15 UMRA has been in
effect since 1996, providing over a decade of experience with its
requirements. Each year the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
provides an annual report on Title I's provisions, and it has produced
five- and ten-year assessments; 16 the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) has published several assessments of the entire Act and
1 7

of Title II in particular.

12 See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
13 See 109 Stat. at 50-64.
14 See id. at 64-67.
15 Title II may have played a role in Congress' decision to use a framework law,
rather than internal rules, to effect the changes in legislative procedures. To the
extent that lawmakers viewed regulatory reform as part of a package with legislative
reform and wanted to adopt both parts of the deal at the same time, then a framework law was the only route to enactment possible because regulatory reform
required a vehicle with the force of law. See Garrett, Conditions, supra note 10, at
312-17 (describing the need to enact all parts of a legislative bargain simultaneously
as a reason for the use of the statutory form).
16 See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, A REVIEW OF CBO's ACTIVITIES IN 2006 UNDER
THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT

(2007) [hereinafter CBO, 2006 REVIEW], avail-

able at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/79xx/doc7982/04-03-UMRA.pdf;

CONG. BUDGET

A REVIEW OF CBO's ACTIVITIES UNDER THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT,
1996 TO 2005 (2006) [hereinafter CBO, TEN-YEAR REVIEW], available at http://www.
OFFICE,

cbo.gov/ftpdocs/71 xx/doc7111/03-31-UMRA.pdf.
17 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, UNFUNDED MANDATES: ANALYSIS OF
REFORM ACT COVERAGE (2004) [hereinafter GAO, COVERAGE], available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d04637.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, UNFUNDED MANDATES: REFORM ACT

HAs

HAD EL'ITLE EFFECT ON AGENCIES'

RULEMAKING ACTIONS
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UMRA does not prohibit Congress from enacting unfunded mandates; instead, it results in the production and dissemination of more
information about intergovernmental mandates (funded and
unfunded) pending in the legislature. It also allows members to raise
points of order against bills with unfunded mandates that exceed certain thresholds, requiring a separate majority vote to impose the mandate; 18 in the 109th Congress, the point of order temporarily provided
additional teeth in the Senate because sixty votes were required to
waive it.19 UMRA defines an intergovernmental mandate as any provi-

sion in law that would "impose an enforceable duty" on a state or local
government; that would reduce or eliminate funding for previously
enacted mandates; or that would increase the stringency of conditions
for certain federal entitlement programs or cut funding for such
2°
programs.
The Act's coverage is relatively narrow; for example, it does not
apply in most cases to duties that are imposed by the federal government as a condition of receiving federal assistance or as part of participating in a voluntary federal program. 2' This gap in coverage is
significant and allows bills with substantial implications for federalism
to escape UMRA review.2 2 For example, the No Child Left Behind Act
of 200123 imposes significant burdens on states and school districts,

but it is not within the scope of UMRA because all the costs incurred
by subnational governments result from complying with conditions of
federal aid. 24 UMRA also has a list of specific exclusions, including

proposals enforcing constitutional rights or antidiscrimination laws;
(1998) [hereinafter GAO, LITTLE EFFECr], available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/
1998/gg98030.pdf.
18 See 2 U.S.C. § 658d (2000).
19 See H.R. Con. Res. 95, 109th Cong. § 403, 119 Stat. 3633, 3652 (2005). In the
fiscal year 2008 concurrent budget resolution, the Senate, now controlled by Democrats, decided to eliminate the supermajority voting requirement, which was originally
to remain in effect through fiscal year 2010. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
This change should not have been a surprise: Senate Democrats had vehemently and
successfully resisted a supermajority voting requirement when UMRA was originally
enacted. See Timothy J. Conlan, James D. Riggle & Donna E. Schwartz, Deregulating
Federalism? The Politics of MandateReform in the 104th Congress, PUBLIUS, Summer 1995,
at 23, 32.
20 Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995 § 421, 2 U.S.C. § 658(5) (2000).
UMRA also applies to mandates affecting tribal governments, but that aspect of the
Act is not relevant to this analysis. See 2 U.S.C. § 1501.
21 See2 U.S.C. § 658(7)(A).
22 See infra text accompanying notes 139-41.
23 Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 20 U.S.C.).
24 See GAO, CovERAGE, supra note 17, at 23-24.
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legislation relating to accounting and auditing procedures for grants;
proposals providing emergency assistance to states and localities;
national security laws and treaty ratifications; and proposals relating to
Social Security. 25 The CBO has estimated that only about two percent
of the bills it has analyzed contained mandates that fell within these
enumerated exceptions. 26 Finally, the Act does not apply to appropriations bills (except it does apply to legislative provisions in such
bills) ;27 this exclusion is more significant than the listed exceptions.
However, the CBO informally reviews all appropriations bills as they
28
are considered and alerts staff if it identifies any mandates.
One of the major goals of UMRA, discussed in more detail in Part
II.B, is to produce more information about intergovernmental mandates for members of Congress and to ensure that the information
plays a role in congressional decisionmaking. When an authorizing
committee reports a bill or joint resolution containing any federal
mandate, it must provide the bill to the Director of the CBO and identify the mandates. 29 The CBO then analyzes the proposed legislation
and prepares an UMRA statement that must be included in the committee's report on the bill.30 If the total direct costs of an intergovernmental mandate exceed $50 million, a figure adjusted for inflation
since 1996,31 in any of the first five fiscal years after the mandate
would become effective, the CBO must provide an estimate of the
direct costs. 32 UMRA defines "direct costs" as "the aggregate esti-

mated amounts that all State, local and tribal governments would be
required to spend or would be prohibited from raising in revenues in
order to comply with the Federal intergovernmental mandate." 3 Furthermore, the CBO must identify any increase in federal appropriations or other spending that has been provided to fund the
mandate.3 4 The CBO also provides mandate statements, if requested
and "to the greatest extent practicable," for floor amendments, con25

See 2 U.S.C. § 658a.

26

See U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, UNFUNDED MANDATES: VIEWS VARY
ABOUT REFORM AcT's STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, AND OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 10
(2005) [hereinafter GAO, VIEWS VARY], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d05454.pdf.
27 See 2 U.S.C. § 658d(c) (1).
28 See CBO, TEN-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 16, at 59 n.2.
29 See 2 U.S.C. § 658b(b).
30 See id. §§ 658b(a), (c)-(d), (f), 658c(a)-(b).
31 The threshold in 2006 was $64 million. See CBO, 2006 REVIEW, supra note 16,
at 2.
32 See 2 U.S.C. § 658c(a) (2).
33 Id. § 658(3)
() ())(.
34 See id. § 658c (a) (2) (c), (b) (2) (B).
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nal estimate if necessary.3 5 From 1996 to 2005, the CBO formally
36
reviewed approximately 5800 bills and other legislative proposals.
Title I of UMRA is enforced through internal parliamentary
devices called "points of order." A point of order can be raised on the
floor of the House or Senate to object to proceeding to a vote on a bill
because a procedural requirement has been violated. In the case of
UMRA, a point of order lies against any legislative proposal reported
out of an authorizing committee that is not accompanied by a mandate report and cost statement.3 7 In addition, any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report that includes an
unfunded intergovernmental mandate exceeding the threshold is subject to a point of order. 38 Congress can provide funding for a mandate in several ways. First, it can be funded through new direct
spending authority, which provides money without further congressional action. 39 Second, if the bill merely authorizes the spending,
then it can identify an appropriations bill that would provide the
actual funding and include provisions to make the effectiveness of the
mandate conditional on Congress' appropriating the required
amounts. 40 This latter provision is called the Byrd Amendment,
named for the Senator from West Virginia who added it during floor
deliberations on UMRA. 41 Under this "lookback" provision, UMRA
requires congressional reconsideration if insufficient appropriations
are provided in the ten years after the mandate becomes effective,
either because the appropriations were never enacted or were scaled
back, or because the CBO's estimates of direct costs turned out to be
lower than the actual costs. 42 In that event, the agency notifies Con-

gress of the shortfall, and if Congress does not provide funding or
scale back the mandate within thirty days, the mandate ceases to be
effective.

43

Until fiscal year 2006, UMRA required only a majority vote in
either house to waive a point of order raised there. 44 This meant that
35

See CBO, TEN-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 16, at 57 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 685c(d)).
36 Id. at 2.
37 See2 U.S.C. § 658d(a) (1).
38 See id. § 658d(a) (2).
39 See id. § 658d(a) (2) (A).
40 See id. § 658d(a) (2) (B).
41 See Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1113, 1157-60 (1997).
42 See2 U.S.C. § 658d(a)(2)(B)(iii).
43 See id.
44 See CBO, TEN-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 16, at 5.
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the enforcement procedure really only mattered in the House of Representatives, because the Senate's less restrictive floor procedures had
essentially always allowed a senator to force a majority vote on a mandate by moving to strike it from the bill. An objecting representative
is further strengthened in the House, because the Act provides that a
special rule promulgated by the Rules Committee attempting to waive
an UMRA point of order without a separate vote is itself out of
order. 45 This restriction on the Rules Committee is important
because most points of order that could be raised in the House, for
example, against budget-related proposals, are waived as part of the
special rules regulating most debate. The point of order process in
the Senate became important in the 109th Congress when the Senate
increased to sixty the votes needed to waive an UMRA point of
order. 4 6 Before that, only about a dozen points of order had been
raised, and all of those had been raised in the House. 47 After the
change in the voting requirement in the Senate, more have been
raised in the House, and two were raised in the Senate, both of which
were sustained, thereby killing two amendments to an appropriations
bill that would have increased the minimum wage. 48 The Senate's voting requirement reverted back to a simple majority in the 110th Congress, 49 perhaps as a result of the change in partisan control of that
body.
Although UMRA can be seen as a stand-alone framework law,
triggered by a certain group of intergovernmental mandates, it is formally an amendment to one of the most important modern framework laws, the congressional budget process. 50 Because of its
relationship to the budget framework and because of the ubiquitous
45 2 U.S.C. § 658e.
46 H.R. Con. Res. 95, 109th Cong. § 403, 119 Stat. 3633, 3652 (2005).
47 See GAO, COVERAGE, supra note 17, at 7.
48 CBO, TEN-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 16, at 5.
49 See S. Con. Res. 21, 110th Cong. § 205 (2007). The version that passed the
Senate initially extended the sixty vote supermajority requirement until 2017, but the
conference report changed the treatment of UMRA points of order to return to the
simple majority requirement. See H.R. REP. No. 110-153, at 16 (2007) (Conf. Rep.).
50 For descriptions of the modem congressional budget process, see WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRIcKEY

ELIZABETH GARRETr, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGIS-

LATION 446-85 (4th ed. 2007); ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET 118-61 (3d ed.
2007). The federal budget framework is governed primarily by 2 U.S.C. §§ 601-688,
900-907d, the product of several laws passed in the last three decades, including the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub L. No. 93-344, 88
Stat. 297, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Star. 1038, and the Budget Enforcement
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. XIII, 104 Stat. 1388-573.
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role of the budget process throughout congressional deliberations,
UMRA shares many of the features of the larger framework law. Both
respond to collective action problems, which I will discuss in more
detail in Part II, that are faced by multimember institutions such as
Congress and are particularly acute in the budget context; both
emphasize the importance of better information to improve congressional deliberations; and both use point of order techniques to
enforce their provisions. At various times during the last three
decades of the modern congressional budget process, some of the
Budget Act's provisions have also been subject to enforcement
through sequesters-or cuts in funding for certain programs triggered when Congress does not keep federal spending within established budget caps. 5 1 A sequester is overseen by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) pursuant to statutory instructions
that limit the OMB's discretion in implementation. 5 2 There is no
comparable enforcement for UMRA, other than the Byrd lookback
provision which has never been used. 53 Even when sequesters have
appeared to be in the offing, however, Congress and the President
usually find a way to avoid such cuts. Thus, the primary enforcement
mechanism for the congressional budget framework has been points
of order (often requiring sixty votes in the Senate to waive, but amenable to mass waiver in the House through a special rule), coupled with
the occasional threat of sequester.
UMRA differs from some salient features of the congressional
budget process in a way relevant to my analysis. One engine of the
modern congressional budget process, budget reconciliation, eliminates some of the major hurdles to enacting legislation, particularly in
the Senate. 54 An omnibus budget reconciliation act, which typically
includes changes to revenue laws and entitlement programs, cannot
be filibustered in the Senate; instead, a reconciliation bill is considered under rules that limit debate significantly and allow passage by a
simple majority. 55 Other provisions make it harder for members to
51

See SCHICK supra note 49, at 295.

52 See AARON WILDAVSKYV&
PROCESS 148-49 (3d ed. 1997).
53

NAOMI CAIDEN, THE NEW POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY

See GAO, COVERAGE, supra note 17, at 16-17.

54 See William G. Dauster, The CongressionalBudget Process, in FISCAL CHALLENGES
4, 26-34 (Elizabeth Garrett, Elizabeth A. Graddy & Howell E. Jackson eds., 2008)
(discussing reconciliation and other procedures affecting budget legislation).

55

See, e.g.,

GREGORYJ. WAWRO

& ERIC

SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER

27 (2006) (stating

that of ninety major laws enacted between 1975 and 1994 only ten passed with fewer
than sixty senators voting in favor, and half of those were budget bills).
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amend budget-related legislation on the floor, 56 which might unravel
deals struck in committee, because the amendments would have prohibited revenue effects. Certainly, reconciliation laws still have to
meet the constitutional requirements for enactment emphasized by
Professor Clark, but passage is more likely for these bills than other
major legislation because internal impediments are eliminated or lessened. UMRA, on the other hand, is designed to add more obstacles to
the enactment of unfunded mandates than usually face legislative proposals; it provides points of order with teeth (immunity from special
rule waivers in the House and, at least for a brief period of time,
supermajority voting requirements in the Senate) so it can disaggregate deals involving unfunded mandates and force targeted votes on
mandates of a certain size.
II.

THE

PURPOSES

SERVED

BY

UMRA

In other work, I have identified five reasons that Congress may
decide to address a problem with a procedural tool like a framework
law, rather than just directly adopting responsive substantive legislation or changing the type of substantive legislation it enacts. 57 In
other words, Congress must have had a reason to adopt UMRA as a
way to structure future decisions about unfunded mandates rather
than altering each unfunded mandate to better comport with the values of federalism when it is considered by the legislature. Framework
laws serve at least five purposes that could not be achieved as easily or
in the same way without them: providing a symbolic response on a
salient issue; articulating neutral rules for a set of future decisions;
serving as a coordination device to solve collective action problems;
entrenching certain objectives so that future decisions are more likely
to meet them; and changing the internal balance of power in Congress. 58 UMRA is motivated by all but the second purpose of framework laws; indeed, it was consciously designed not to be neutral
among outcomes but to stack the deck against unfunded mandates. I
will discuss each of the other four purposes as they relate to UMRA.
A.

A Symbolic Response

Laws often serve expressive or symbolic purposes along with
other objectives. This is not necessarily an indictment of the law;
indeed, in some cases, the success of a law as a symbol can also facili56
57
58

See, e.g., Dauster, supra note 53, at 19.
See Garrett, supra note 8, at 733-63.
See id. at 733.
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tate its success along other dimensions. However, in some cases, legislation is designed cynically as empty symbolism to allow lawmakers to
appear to respond to constituent demands while allowing politics as
usual to continue. There is some reason to believe that UMRA was
empty symbolism for at least some supporters; for example, the Byrd
lookback provision that requires a reassessment of mandates if the
promised funding is never enacted or falls short has never been implemented. The nature of federalism itself may lead to largely symbolic
responses by Congress because federalism is a relatively abstract con59
cept that voters find attractive but hard to understand concretely.
We will return to the challenges of abstraction in designing an appropriate framework law in Part III; here, it is sufficient to note that symbolic responses are more likely in such a context-and they are more
likely to quiet the public advocating for reform.
However, if supporters hoped to enact an empty symbol, they did
not succeed. UMRA has affected the dynamics of congressional deliberation and the substance of legislation enacted by Congress in the
more than ten years it has been effective. The CBO reports that its
analysts meet frequently with congressional aides so that legislation is
drafted to avoid running afoul of UMRA. 60 Observers generally
believe that UMRA has the most influence before a bill reaches the
floor as drafters work to avoid its provisions. Former House Rules
Committee Chairman Gerald Solomon (R-N.Y.) observed: "It has
changed the way that prospective legislation is drafted .... Anytime
there is a markup, this always comes up."6' For example, the Internet
Tax Freedom Act (ITFA),62 considered in 1997, would have prohibited states and localities from collecting some taxes for a period of
time. 63 This falls under UMRA's scope because direct costs include
amounts that states and localities "would be prohibited from raising in
revenues" as a consequence of a mandate. 64 The CBO originally esti59 Cf Rodney E. Hero, The U.S. Congress and American Federalism:Are "Subnational"
Governments Protected?, 42 W. POL. Q. 93, 95 (1989) (noting that "it is not clear that
citizens understand, much less attach particularly high value to" various principles of
government, including federalism).
60 See Theresa A. Gullo &Janet M. Kelly, Federal Unfunded MandateReform: A FirstYear Retrospective, 58 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 379, 384-85 (1998).
61
CONG.

Allan Freedman, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act: A Partial "Contract" Success, 56
Q. WKv. REp. 2318, 2318 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

62 Pub. L. No. 105-277, tit. Xl, §§ 1101-04, 112 Stat. 2681-719 to 2681-726 (1998)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 note (West Supp. 2007)).
63 See Theresa Gullo, History and Evaluation of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 57
NAT'L TAX J. 559, 567 (2004).
64

2 U.S.C. § 658(3) (2000).
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65
mated that the Act's direct costs would exceed the UMRA threshold.
The cost statement was a significant factor in Congress' decision to
amend ITFA so that it was "narrower in scope and specifically allowed
states that were currently collecting a sales tax on Internet access to
continue to do so. '' 66 The amended proposal's direct costs fell below
the threshold; thus, the bill was not subject to a point of order when it
was considered on the floor.
The sixty-vote point of order in the Senate also had real conse-

quences when it was in effect. In 2005, the enforcement mechanism
was used to defeat two amendments to raise the minimum wage that
were offered to an appropriations bill. 67 Minimum wage bills, which
apply to states and localities, are unfunded mandates that typically
trigger UMRA's protections because the burden they impose far
exceeds the threshold and, of course, they are not funded by the federal government. 68 Here, dueling amendments were offered, one by
Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) to raise the minimum wage substantially, and the other offered by Senator Michael Enzi (R-Wyo.) to
raise the minimum wage and also to exempt many small businesses
from many federal labor practices. 69 One watchdog group, OMB
Watch, claimed that the supermajority requirement in the Senate
''transformed a relatively harmless procedural mechanism into an
insurmountable roadblock to important protections for the public
interest. ' 70 With the reversion to a simple majority voting requirement in fiscal year 2008, the Senate point of order process will be
much less significant.
For those supporters who had hoped that UMRA would usher in
real changes in the deliberative process and serve goals in addition to
symbolic purposes, it is still quite likely that the symbolism of a framework law was important to them. The issue of unfunded mandates
had been placed on the national agenda through a series of symbolic
events. The campaign to eliminate or reduce unfunded mandates was
led by the intergovernmental lobby. This group is a loosely coordi65 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, MANDATES STATEMENT: H.R. 3529 INTERNET TAx FREEDOM ACT OF 1998, at 4 (1998), availableat http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xx/doc608/
hr3529-m.pdf.
66 Gullo, supra note 63, at 568.
67 See 151 CONG. REc. S11,547 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 2005); 151 CONG. REc. S11,512
(daily ed. Oct. 17, 2005).
68 Perhaps not surprisingly, both NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
835-36 (1976), and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528,
528 (1985), deal with federal minimum wage statutes.
69 See 151 CONG. REc. S11,547-48 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 2005).
70 Senate Uses Minimum Wage Increase to Push Anti-Regulatory Agenda, OMB WATCH,
Nov. 1, 2005, http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/3151/1/326.
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nated coalition of more than sixty organizations representing state
and local public officials. 7 1 The most influential are "The Big Seven,"
comprising the Council of State Governments, the International City
Management Association, the Nation's Association of Counties, the
National Conference of State Legislatures, the National Governors'
Association, the National League of Cities, and the United States Conference of Mayors. 72 These groups funded several studies about the
impact of unfunded mandates on states and localities, and they organized high-profile protests to move the issue to the forefront of the
national agenda. Perhaps the best known study estimated the costs of
unfunded mandates on 314 cities surveyed to be $6.5 billion in 1993
and $54 billion in the following five years. 73 Although the methodology of the study was attacked,7 4 it was influential in shaping the policy
debate. The report was released during a rally on the Capitol steps on
"National Unfunded Mandates (NUM) Day" held on October 27,
1993. 7 5 The publicity did result in heightened attention to the extent
and effect of unfunded mandates; the number of newspaper articles
mentioning "unfunded federal mandates" rose from 22 in 1992 to 836
in 1994,76 right before the debate began in Congress.
Efforts to pass UMRA fell short, however, despite the lobbying,
until the Republican takeover of the House, facilitated in part by the
potent symbolism of the "Contract with America." The Contract was
the national platform developed by House Republicans in their successful bid to achieve majority status in the 1994 midterm elections.
In its opening passages, the Contract declared, "[I] n this era of official
evasion and posturing, we offer instead a detailed agenda for national
renewal, a written commitment with no fine print."77 The Contract
emphasized that it was a written, binding commitment-thus, the symbolism of using a statute, passed in the traditional way that all legislation is passed, was important in signaling to voters that lawmakers had

met their pledge in an especially meaningful way. Republicans promised to bring to the floor of the House, within the first 100 days of the
104th Congress, ten bills, one of which included unfunded mandates
71

See

DAVID ARNOLD

AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

& JEREMY

PLANT, PUBLIC OFFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS AND STATE

1-14 (1994).

72 Id. at 15 n.1.
73 PRICE WATERHOUSE, IMPACT OF UNFUNDED FEDERAL MANDATES ON U.S. CITIES 4
(1993) (funded by the United States Conference of Mayors).
74 See Melissa Romine, Politics, the Environment, and Regulatory Reform at the Environmental Protection Agency, 6 ENVTL. LAW 1, 32-34 (1999).
75
76

See Gullo & Kelly, supra note 60, at 380.
Conlan, Riggle & Schwartz, supra note 19, at 27.

77

CONTRACT WITH AMERICA

7 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994).
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reform. 78 UMRA was indeed one of the first promises in the Contract
to be considered in both houses-Majority Leader Dole designated it
as S. 1 to signal UMRA's importance to his agenda, 79 and it was H.R. 5
in the House. 80 It was the first promise fulfilled, and one of the few
promises in the Contract to be enacted.8 1 In short, UMRA is a part of
a larger symbol, the Contract with America, that continues to
represent to Republicans the way they achieved control of the House
after decades of being in the minority.
A framework law was the best way to respond to the cries for a
reduction in the number and scope of unfunded mandates, even if
one assumes that a Republican Congress was likely to pass fewer
unfunded mandates without a framework. 8 2 The demand by those
seeking reform was to change the way Congress makes decisions in
this arena. Although lawmakers could promise to behave differently
in the future, a framework law is a way for Congress as an institution to
credibly commit to a long-lasting change in behavior-at least, the law
is as credible as the enforcement mechanisms it contains. Moreover, a
framework law which applies indefinitely (until discarded or changed)
is a suitable answer to a concern that the problem is a long-term one
that demands a comprehensive response, one that will apply to laws in
the future, not just to the immediate decision.
In other words, one aspect of the symbolic value of passing a
framework law is that it saliently demonstrates Congress' commitment
to meet other objectives that a framework is peculiarly suited to-in
this case, entrenching the view that unfunded mandates should be
harder to pass than other legislation. By virtue of its enactment, its
requirements for frequent cost statements, and its lurking threat of
points of order that cannot be waived under the radar screen by special rules, it may also more prominently place the issue of unfunded
78 See Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act, H.R. 9, 104th Cong., tit. X,
§§ 10001-10507 (1995).
79 See 141 CONG. Rc. 1158 (1995).
80 See id. at 564.
81 See Gullo & Kelly, supra note 60, at 380.
82 This assumption is doubtful. As I will discuss in Part lI.C, collective action
problems beset Congress in this arena so even lawmakers committed to a view of
federalism which is hostile to unfunded intergovernmental mandates might enact
more than they would prefer. Recent experience also suggests that Republican
national legislators are just as willing to preempt state and local government action
and impose directives on the states as Democrats, albeit on different topics. National
laws concerning education, marriage policy, reproductive decisions, and tax policy
have been warmly received by Republicans in the same way that environmental regulations, minimum wage laws, and safety rules are by Democrats.
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mandates on the congressional agenda in the future.8 3 Certainly, the
even more influential congressional budget process has led to a
greater consciousness about budget consequences when Congress is
legislating in any realm. John Ferejohn explains that lawmakers will
sometimes adopt mechanisms to better assure accountability by facilitating monitoring by constituents because these arrangements
increase the trust that the principals are willing to accord their
agents. 84 Although he makes this point with respect to rule changes

increasing transparency in government, a similar dynamic may have
led to the promise in the Contract with America and the subsequent
adoption of UMRA.
B.

Solving a Collective Action Problem to Produce Information

Like many other procedures in legislatures, framework laws operate to help multimember bodies solve collective action problems. In
particular, frameworks like UMRA and the congressional budget process are designed to produce more optimal amounts of information.
Without a centralized entity providing information and a way to
ensure it is made available broadly and in a timely manner, valuable
information is apt to be underproduced by a legislature. All legislators benefit when a particular legislator or her staff spends time developing data, but the legislator who produces the information uses time
that she could have spent on tasks contributing more directly to her
reelection. Thus, an individual lawmaker will not internalize all the
benefits of information production if she wishes to use it in public
debate, but she will shoulder all the costs. In the end, information
will be underproduced without intervention. UMRA solves this problem, at least partially, because the State and Local Government Cost
Estimates Unit of the CBO prepares mandate cost statements that are
available to committees during their consideration of bills and to all
members of Congress during floor deliberations. 85 The CBO itself
was created by the 1974 Budget Act to solve a similar collective action
problem in producing budget information, 8 6 a problem that had dis83 See GAO, VIEws VARY, supra note 26, at 22; see also 145 CONG. REc. 1783 (1999)
(statement of Rep. Condit) (stating that an "atmosphere of awareness" about intergovernmental mandates "has been fostered by the point of order procedure established under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act").
84 See John Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theoiy of Political
Accountability, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 131, 148-49

(Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes & Bernard Manin eds. 1999).
85 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 658(b)-(c) (2000); Gullo, supra note 63, at 561-62 & n.3.
86 See Congressional Budget & Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-344, § 2, 88 Stat. 297, 298 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 621 (2000)) (establishing the
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advantaged the legislative branch relative to the President with his
specialized 0MB staff.
Intergovernmental mandates present particularly acute problems
relating to information that a framework law can mitigate. First,
determining the magnitude of costs associated with a particular intergovernmental mandate can be difficult, particularly for a lone member of Congress without a large or sophisticated staff. For example,
the estimate of costs to comply with the Fair Labor Standard Act's
overtime provisions required studying the effects on 3000 counties,
19,000 municipalities, 17,000 townships, 15,000 school districts, and
29,000 local special districts . 7 An estimate of the direct costs of intergovernmental mandates contained in the Personal Data Privacy and
Security Act of 2005 noted that the requirements would affect more
than 190,000 entities, including "75,000 municipal governments,
about 3,600 counties, more than 100 public hospitals, about 100,000
schools, 14,000 school districts, and more than 1,500 public post-secondary institutions."8 8 It would be difficult for a member of Congress
with his personal staff, or even a committee chair with her staff, to
gather and analyze this amount of data. Lobbyists may in some cases
provide information about the burden of intergovernmental mandates, although lawmakers and their aides must discount this information somewhat because it is provided by interested parties. Although
lobbyists are repeat players who need to establish reputations for
truthfulness, they will also work to present information in a way that
will buttress their arguments and favor the outcome they prefer.
Under the UMRA framework, interested groups still interact with the
CBO as it produces mandate cost statements and provides necessary
data, but that information is weighed and analyzed by the CBO's professional, nonpartisan staff before it is disseminated to Congress and
8
used in deliberation and debate.

9

CBO "to assure effective congressional control over the budgetary process" and "to

provide for the furnishing of information by the executive branch in a manner that
will assist the Congress in discharging its duties").
87 Theresa A. Gullo, Estimating the Impact of Federal Legislation on State and Local
Governments, in COPING WITH MANDATES 41, 46-47 (Michael Fix & Daphne Kenyon
eds., 1990).
88 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST
SECURITY ACT OF 2005, at 5 (2006),

S. 1789 PERSONAL DATA PRIVACY AND
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/71xx/

EsTIMATE:

doc7l6l/s1789.pdf; see also S. REP. No. 104-308, at 43-44 (1996) (concerning the

direct costs of an act applying federal workplace health and safety laws to all public
workplaces and indicating that the mandate would affect thirty-one states or territo-

ries, 54,500 governmental units, and 29,000 local special districts).
89 Interestingly, UMRA may solve a problem facing interest groups that arises
from the collective nature of Congress. Before UMRA, interest groups had to interact
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Second, information must be provided at a time it is useful-that
is, when it can change the outcome of decisions. A member who does
not sit on a particular committee may not be aware of an intergovernmental mandate until the bill comes to the floor, and there may be
little time for her to generate information, analyze the data, and disseminate it. Even if she can, it is difficult in the House to amend
major laws once they reach the floor because they are usually considered under restrictive special rules. Even in the more freewheeling
Senate, most of the changes in legislation occur at the committee
stage or before the bill arrives for consideration by the full body.
UMRA solves this problem by providing information during the committee deliberations and often during the initial drafting stages. If a
mandate cost statement does not accompany a bill to the floor, then a
point of order can halt its consideration until the information is
provided.
Third, a framework can require information to be provided in a
way that illuminates the cumulative effect of many decisions made
over time. The UMRA framework does not address this informational
problem as directly as it does the other two challenges.9 0 UMRA's
disclosure provisions apply bill-by-bill or for individual amendments
and do not provide a running tally or larger perspective except in the
annual reports. The CBO has published five- and ten-year assessments
of its work under UMRA, in addition to the annual assessments.
These retrospective documents give a fuller sense of all the intergovernmental mandates of significance considered by Congress over several years. However, their focus is on mandates that exceed the
statutory threshold, so there is no assessment of the cumulative financial effect of mandates with direct costs below $50-64 million annually. 91 Presumably, this total figure could be quite substantial; in the
first ten years UMRA has been in effect, 700 bills contained intergovernmental mandates, but only sixty-four of those included mandates
with a variety of substantive and appropriations committees, any of which could consider and recommend unfunded mandates. Now, groups can rely on the CBO mandate cost statement process to identify mandates and help them target their efforts,
and they have one centralized entity with the responsibility for analyzing such man-

dates. Thus, lobbyists can use their time more efficiently, providing information to
the CBO as it develops estimates and using the information the CBO produces to

target particular committees considering significant intergovernmental mandates.
90 See GAO, VIEws VARY, supra note 26, at 23.
91 Although the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Mandates was
charged by UMRA to prepare a series of reports providing a broader vision of federal
mandates, setting out their costs and benefits, and providing recommendations for
change, the Commission was disbanded at the end of fiscal year 1996 before it could
fulfill most of these objectives. See Gullo & Kelly, supra note 60, at 386.
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that exceeded the threshold.9 2 Congress could require more extensive review of the total direct costs of all mandates and an identification of how many of these mandates were ultimately unfunded.
However, this would require a substantial commitment of time and
energy by the CBO. Unless there was some way to enforce this informational requirement, it is likely that it would not be a top priority for
93
the CBO as it deploys its limited staff and resources.
One can imagine different designs for frameworks aimed to produce information about aggregate costs of mandates and designed to
increase the likelihood that the information would play a larger role
in deliberation, although such frameworks are likely to be unworkable
in practice. For example, just as the budget process has applied caps
on spending to constrain the overall effect of the many decisions
made in the twelve appropriations bills, Congress could set annual or
multi-year limits on the total costs of unfunded mandates-a sort of
"unfunded mandates budget" that would constrain decisions made in
dozens of bills passed during the session. The challenge with such a
framework would be its enforcement. Statutory budget caps were
enforced until fiscal year 2002 through the sequestration process
requiring the OMB to uniformly reduce federal spending if the total
exceeded the limit. 94 It is not clear how Congress could effectively
apply such a process to unfunded mandates. Perhaps a point of order
process could make it more difficult to enact additional mandates
once the limitation had been reached in a particular year. Such an
enforcement mechanism would result in a rush to legislate before the
cap is reached, and it would also encourage drafters of mandates late
in the session to delay the effective dates so that the costs would fall in
years with room under the cap. That, in turn, would just exacerbate
the problem in the later year-or put pressure on Congress to lift that
year's cap. 95 Perhaps the Byrd lookback provision could provide a
model to enforce a comprehensive mandates budget, but it is difficult
to imagine how a set of mandates could be sensibly cut back. One can
reduce funding in all federal programs by ten percent to meet a
spending cap, although not without sometimes severe fiscal pain, but
92 See CBO, TEN-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 16, at 2-3.
93 See Garrett, supra note 41, at 1153-54 (describing the ineffectiveness of the
State and Local Cost Estimate Act of 1981, the precursor to UMRA, because of
absence of enforcement).
94 See Cheryl D. Block, Budget Gimmicks, in FISCAL CHALLENGES, supra note 54, at
39, 41.
95 This is a problem similar to that raised by advance appropriations, where Congress makes an appropriation in one fiscal year but scores the money against a cap in
a future fiscal year. See SCHICK, supra note 50, at 75, 78.
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how does one cut back a requirement to upgrade government workplaces to meet safety requirements by ten percent? How does one
shave ten percent off an intergovernmental mandate that preempted
the states' taxing authority in an area? In some cases, the federal government might be able to instruct states to pare the mandate back by
a certain amount and provide them the flexibility to determine how to
reduce the burden, but many intergovernmental mandates do not
operate in ways to make a pro rata reduction in their scope feasible.
Framework laws, like UMRA, can solve the relatively benign, but
potentially serious problem of producing sufficient relevant information for a collective body that suffers from free-rider problems. The
hope is that better informed lawmakers will not pass as many laws that
burden states and localities with unfunded mandates; the argument is
that legislators are well-intentioned but through ignorance pass laws
that they would prefer not to. However, it may be that a more troubling phenomenon explains why federal lawmakers successfully and
frequently negotiate through the "finely wrought" constitutional
requirements of lawmaking to pass legislation that undermines the
values of federalism. Framework laws can also help in this context by
erecting more hurdles than the few in Article I and targeting the
more rigorous procedures, as much as possible, to the set of legislative
proposals that are especially problematic.
C. Entrenchinga Bias in Favor of Federalism
Members of Congress are likely to pass more laws burdening state
and local governments and preempting state policies than would be
optimal for several reasons. First, all national lawmakers wish to effect
change in various policies, both because they believe change serves
what they view as the best interest of the country and because their
reelection is helped when they can tell voters they passed laws that
voters favor. Thus, even if some lawmakers believe that certain policies are better adopted and implemented on the state level, they may
nonetheless resort to federal lawmaking as a second-best alternative
over which they have more influence. In that way, they ensure the
reform happens-and they claim credit for it. To put it another way,
people seldom seek national office, enduring the difficulties of the
modern campaign, only to argue that other political actors ought to
96
be making key decisions while they sit back and watch.
96 Cf Zoi Baird, State Empowerment After Garcia, 18 UiRa. LAw. 491, 504 (1986)
(noting that "Congress faces a conflict of interest whenever its legislation presents an
assertion of federal power the states argue infringes on their sovereignty").
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Second, the context of allocation of resources in a federal system
gives rise to particular pathologies that are likely to lead to congressional enactment of a greater level of unfunded intergovernmental
mandates than is optimal. These pathologies are so strong that the
constitutional lawmaking requirements will not stand in the way of
many of these laws, and thus stringently enforcing the constitutional
procedures, as Professor Clark urges, 97 will not necessarily provide
much protection for the values of federalism. Lawmakers who hope
to be reelected will rationally prefer to separate the act of establishing
popular federal programs from the act of raising funds to pay for
them if by doing so they can avoid responsibility for the latter act. In
particular, politicians desperately wish to avoid raising taxes, a salient
issue for most voters during an election. There are several ways that
Congress can try to distance itself from raising taxes. Lawmakers can
fund programs through deficit spending, which shifts the burden of
financing to people who are not yet voting, and indeed who may not
yet be born. 98 Another attractive funding option for a federal
lawmaker is to force state and local governments to shoulder the
bill-a practice called "liability-shifting" 9 9-as long as the federal legislators can still claim credit for the popular programs that are receiving the funds. The ability to engage in liability-shifting may lead
members of Congress to impose more unfunded mandates on states
and localities than they think is consistent with a robust federal system. 100 In the end, their preference to claim credit for new programs
without taking the blame for decisions made to provide funding overcomes any preference they have about the appropriate balance of
power between federal and subnational governments. Many simply
cannot withstand the temptation, no matter what their other values
and no matter what their partisan affiliation.
Federal lawmakers can engage in liability-shifting because it is difficult for state and local officials to argue persuasively to voters that
higher state or local taxes or reduced services are the result of deci97 See Clark, supra note 1, at 1372-93.
98 The congressional budget framework, particularly after the adoption of
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings in the mid-1980s and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990,
see supra note 50, has made it more difficult, but certainly not impossible, for Congress to use deficit financing.
99 Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer
State Officers to Implement FederalLaw?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1065 (1995).
100 See Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady
Path": A Theory of JudicialEnforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1472-73
(1995) (explaining the prisoner's dilemma problem in the context of federalism
generally).
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sions made in Washington, D.C. 10 1 Tracing such an action back to the
cost of several unfunded mandates is difficult and time consuming,
and voters are apt to be cynical when they hear subnational officials
make these arguments, assuming instead that the lower level officials
are the ones shirking responsibility. The possibility of taking advantage of this fiscal illusion may cause federal legislators to ignore principles of federalism when constructing national policies, even if their
past experience predisposes them to be sympathetic to such values.
Moreover, if federal lawmakers avoid all or most of the responsibility
for funding national priorities, they may never develop a full sense of
the costs of those programs and thus pass more costly programs than
would be desirable. It is not only voters who may suffer from a fiscal
illusion; lawmakers who are not held accountable for the costs of programs may not appropriately consider them in determining which
policies have benefits that exceed their costs.
A framework law can help correct this bias by erecting more hurdles in the path of legislation that is susceptible to these pathologies.
Supermajority voting requirements are a straightforward way to make
legislating in an area more difficult. Although the cloture rules,
which require sixty votes to cut off debate in the Senate and bring a
bill to a vote, provide supermajority vote protection to all but a handful of bills like budget reconciliation acts and fast-track trade proposals, a targeted supermajority vote requirement to waive a point of
order may be less costly for opponents to use. Opponents using an
UMRA point of order coupled with a supermajority voting requirement for waiver, for example, do not need to threaten to filibuster a
bill-a threat that is less costly in the modern Senate than it was in
previous decades 10 2 but still more costly than a point of order procedure that includes little or no debate and forces an immediate ruling
and vote. In addition, a point of order enforcement scheme empowers one or a few lawmakers with intense preferences on a particular
issue-such as a view that our federal system should vest substantially
more power and responsibility at the subnational level than is likely,
given legislative dynamics. It is clear that some lawmakers do have
strong preferences favoring substantial state and local authority and
power; Lamar Alexander (R-Tenn.), the senator who pushed the
change in 2005 to require sixty votes to waive an UMRA point of
order, is one such lawmaker who characterizes himself as incapable of
101 But see David A. Dana, The Case for Unfunded EnvironmentalMandates, 69 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1, 18-21 (1995) (arguing that voters should be able to get information about
liability-shifting if the problem of unfunded mandates is serious enough).

102

See

W"AWRO & SCHICKLER,

supra note 55, at 259-61.
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getting "over being Governor."' 0 3 Others in the Senate share these
preferences with differing intensities; keep in mind that 368 members
of the 110th Congress had some experience as state or local
lawmakers before coming to Washington. 10 4 And a few anticipate that

they may return to state office when they leave Congress.' 0 5
Even if only a handful retain their commitment to a particular
vision of federalism that would recalibrate the balance to favor subnational governments more, they can use a framework law's point of
order process to block or change proposals inconsistent with that
vision. As long as they can command the support of a significant
minority, senators can block enactment of provisions subject to a
point of order enforced through a sixty-vote supermajority requirement. Had the Senate retained the supermajority voting requirement
when the Democrats took over with a slim majority, then the minority
party could have effectively used this procedure to block change it
opposed. Even when the rules allow only a simple majority to waive
the point of order, the framework can be used to make issues more
salient by forcing a vote on a particular provision that would otherwise
be buried in an omnibus proposal. The ability to disaggregate provisions and force separate votes, even those determined by a simple
majority, may be enough to kill the provision. Omnibus bills are usually the product of logrolling; although the bargains may survive
targeted votes, it may also be the case that disaggregating the package
and requiring separate votes will unravel the agreement. 10 6 Each provision in an omnibus bill may not alone command majority support,
103 See 152 CONG.REc. S1391 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 2006) (statement of Sen. Alexander). One wonders if he would have found it easier to get over his past had he been
elected to a leadership position in the Senate; in 2006 he lost by one vote to Trent
Lott (R-Miss.) in the election for minority whip. Adam Nossiter & David M. Herszenhorn, Mississippi'sLott to Leave Senate Seat Held Since '88, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2007,
at A20.
104 This figure is derived from the biographies of Congressmembers found in
CONG. QUARTERLY, CQ's POLITICS IN AMERICA 2008: THE 110TH CONGRESS (Jackie
Koszczuk & Martha Angle eds., 2007). I considered local government experience to
be service as mayor, member of a city council, member of a school board, or county
supervisor. State experience included state legislator, governor, lieutenant governor,
attorney general, secretary of state, treasurer, tax commissioner, or other "cabinet
level" state official. See also Hero, supra note 59, at 96 (finding moderate levels of
support by members of Congress for principles of federalism, but finding differences
across delegations and finding support affected by ideology and party).
105 Notable examples of politicians who have left national positions for state office
are Jon Corzine of New Jersey, Bill Richardson of New Mexico, and Arch Alfred
Moore, Jr. of West Virginia, all who became governors after service in Congress.
106 See GLEN S. KRUTZ, HITCHING A RIDE 32-35 (2001) (describing the use of omnibus bills to facilitate compromise).
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even if the bill as a whole can pass the House or Senate. Special rules
in the House keep such packages intact; a point of order that singles a
10 7
provision out for a separate vote threatens that equilibrium.
UMRA puts additional procedural hurdles in the way of
unfunded intergovernmental mandates that exceed a certain threshold of direct costs. Other frameworks could apply similar procedures
to different kinds of legislation that implicate federalism values, such
as federal laws that preempt state or local requirements.1 0 8 In these
cases, a framework acts as a precommitment device to protect certain
values of federalism through enhanced procedures.
One question that arises with any precommitment device is what
group of lawmakers is being bound by the framework? In the case of
UMRA, the enactors sought to bind themselves and future Congresses. The need to bind themselves stemmed from the awareness of
the pathologies discussed above that might lead Congress to pass
more unfunded mandates than members would prefer. More importantly, UMRA's framework provided a way to demonstrate to voters
that the Contract with America would be more than empty promises
because it would include binding enforcement procedures. In this
respect, the precommitment was more symbolic than real, since presumably those lawmakers would have attempted to keep their promise
even in the absence of the disciplinary device.
However, UMRA applies indefinitely, suggesting that lawmakers
sought to entrench a particular vision of federalism beyond the 104th
Congress, and perhaps beyond the period of Republican control. I0 9
In particular, the supermajority voting requirement, passed in a later
Republican Senate, I" 0 was intended to provide some assurance to
those who were in the enacting Congress' (perhaps slim) majority that
they could block enactment of certain proposals even if they could
only muster the support of a minority. Recent Congresses have had
razor-thin majorities, which means both that a member of today's
107 Another mechanism that can disaggregate logrolls is the line item veto power
or its close cousin, the enhanced rescission authority that had been provided to the
President in a different framework law also growing out of the Contract with America.
See Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200, invalidated by
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); see also Elizabeth Garrett, The Story of
Clinton v. City of New York: Congress Can Take Care of Itself, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
STORIES 47, 56-57 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2005) (describing enhanced rescission).
108 See infra text accompanying notes 144-49.
109 For suggestions that such was the intent of the enacting Congress, see Angela
Antonelli, Promises Unfulfilled: Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, REGULATION,
Spring 1996, at 44-45; Comm. on Fed. Legislation, The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
of 1995, 50 REc. Ass'N BAR Crr N.Y. 669, 683 (1995).
110 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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majority may be in tomorrow's minority, and that the minority block is
likely to be fairly strong. If the future majority wishes to avoid obstruction by a determined minority, it will have to repeal the entrenching
aspect of the framework. Here, the supermajority voting requirement
to waive an UMRA objection was repudiated as part of the conference
agreement on a large omnibus concurrent budget resolution."' In
other cases, however, lawmakers may find repealing parts of the
framework difficult if interest groups value it, remain vigilant, and can
credibly threaten to punish those who vote for the repeal. Other
supermajority voting protections in the budget process have proved
more resistant to repeal.
UMRA may also represent an effort by one house of Congress to
bind the other house. Past experience had demonstrated that the
Senate was more inclined to enact unfunded mandates reform than
the House, a state of affairs consistent with Professor Clark's view of
the Senate as the key player in the constitutional scheme for lawmaking that provides some protection for the values of federalism. 1 12 Legislation proposing unfunded mandates reform had been adopted in
the Senate in the 103rd Congress, but had been blocked in the
House. 113 Thus, when both houses were controlled by the Democrats-as they were in that Congress-the Senate took the problem of
unfunded mandates more seriously, in part because it was more ideologically conservative than the Democratic House and perhaps in part
because of the difference in how states are represented in the Senate.
When a shift in partisan control of Congress removed the obstacles to
UMRA in the House, it is not surprising that the framework ultimately
adopted more severely constrained the House than the Senate.
Indeed, it essentially transformed the rules governing the House floor
so that they resembled the Senate's floor process with respect to
unfunded mandates. The House Rules Committee lost the power to
waive UMRA points of order in a special rule governing debate on a
bill with unfunded mandates, thereby allowing individual members to
raise a point of order and force a separate vote on any unfunded mandate." 14 Thus, UMRA may be an example of one house attempting to
influence the outcomes in the other house before formal
interchamber negotiations begin in conference committee.
111 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
112 See Clark, supra note 1, at 1371-72 (discussing the effect of the Seventeenth
Amendment on the influence of states in the Senate but noting the continued key
role that the Senate plays in the constitutional scheme of lawmaking).
113 See Conlan, Riggle & Schwartz, supra note 19, at 28-31.
114 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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One question about frameworks as precommitment devices is
whether they really are enforceable. Frameworks are part of the internal rules of each house, albeit rules adopted as part of statutes. Either
house can change its rules through a majority vote,' 15 and both
houses have ignored rules when enough members wanted to pass legislation that might be hindered by robust enforcement of disciplinary
devices. UMRA's enforcement mechanisms have been invoked very
infrequently in the past decade, and in only a few cases did the objection halt deliberation on the offending provision.1 1 6 However, the
effect of the point of order may well be felt before the bill reaches the
floor, as legislation is changed by drafters and committees to avoid
triggering a point of order when they are not confident they have the
votes on the floor to waive the objection. 1 7 So merely analyzing the
points of order and their outcomes does not provide a full picture of
the influence of enforcement provisions. One question, to which I
shall return in Part III, is whether courts have a role, as Professor
Clark urges they do with respect to constitutional procedures, to
ensure that internal rules like those put in place by UMRA are followed by Congress.""8 Should a bill that has met the requirements of
bicameralism and presentment nonetheless be subject to judicial challenge perhaps because a point of order that could have properly been
raised never was?
D. Altering the Balance of Power in Congress

In many cases, drafters of framework laws intend to shift power
within Congress because they believe the current institutional
arrangements are part of the reason for the series of problematic decisions targeted by the framework.1 19 Also, some drafters may hope to
115 Rules in the Senate may require supermajority support to change rules. See
infra note 153 and accompanying text.
116 See Gullo, supra note 63, at 562 (providing an estimate of the number of objections raised in the first eight years). As discussed above, the two points of order raised
in the Senate were sustained and killed the amendments. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70. In addition, one point of order raised early in the House was sustained, although the point of order was probably improperly asserted. See Garrett,
supra note 41, at 1144-45.

117 See GAO, COVERAGE, supra note 17, at 19 ("'This is like a shoal out in the water.
You know it is there, so you steer clear of it.'" (quoting a lobbyist for the National
League of Cities)).
118 See infra text accompanying notes 156-81.
119 For an analysis of the budget framework as a way to shift power within Congress, see D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION
(1991). See also McNollgast, The Political Economy of Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 1651, 1683 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) ("[M]uch of
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benefit from any change and thus support the framework for selfinterested reasons. UMRA clearly has shifted power away from committees in Congress, although it is not as clear where the power
moved. It appears to have strengthened centralized entities in Congress, as well as empowered individual members on the floors of the
House and the Senate. In addition, the temporary change in Senate
rules to add the teeth of a supermajority voting requirement to the
UMRA point of order procedure strengthened substantial minority
blocks in the Senate.
If decisions concerning unfunded mandates suffer from the
pathologies described above, those pathologies may be particularly
acute in congressional committees, the place where most decisions
about whether to use unfunded mandates to achieve policy goals are
made. The committee system works, in part, because its members
have particular interests in the subject matter of the committees on
which they sit. Members are willing to invest significant time in committee work to develop expertise in a specialized arena because they
are motivated to do so, perhaps because their constituents are especially affected by the committee's decision or because of their personal interest in the topic. 120 Other lawmakers will defer to the
committee because of its members' greater knowledge, but they will
also be aware that the preferences of the median lawmaker may
diverge from the preferences of committee members. Although there
is disagreement about how representative congressional committees
are of the larger membership, 21 it is clear that party leaders are aware

the legislative process involves attempts to mitigate the problem of delegation inside
the legislature, principally to committees and party leaders.").
120 See KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 75 (1992);
Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Who Controls? Information and the Structure of
Legislative Decision Making, 19 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 361, 371 (1994).
121

Compare GLENN R.

PARKER,

CONGRESS AND THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY

74-81

(1996) (arguing that committees will consist of preference outliers because of distributional politics), and Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96J. POL.
ECON. 132, 148-52 (1988) (same), with GARY W. Cox & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS,.LEGISIATIVE LEVIATHAN 176-210 (2d ed. 2007) (arguing that committees are largely representative but providing different views of the importance of the party structure in
Congress), and KREHBIEL, supra note 120, at 105-50 (same). For further discussion
on this topic, see Cox & MCCUBBINS, supra, at 210 ("Self-selection ... is only half the

story. The other half, equally important, is the regulatory effort of each party's committee on committees."); KIEWIET & MCCUBBINS, supra note 119, at 100-31 (analyzing
the makeup of the House Appropriations Committee and subcommittees and finding
committees to be relatively representative).
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of the possibility of divergence in preferences and use various methods to ensure that committees do not stray too far afield.
Framework laws are a way to shift the balance of power away from
committees when other lawmakers are concerned enough about the
divergence to bear the higher costs of monitoring or disciplining committees. In the case of unfunded mandates, lawmakers may fear that
the temptation to use unfunded intergovernmental mandates to
achieve policy objectives passionately supported by committee members is so great that the substantive committees will inevitably adopt
substantially more than the optimal level of such mandates. In other
words, although the committee members may not diverge significantly
from the median lawmaker's preference as to the right policy, committee members, who support that policy intensely, may be more willing to use unfunded mandates to achieve that objective than would
the median lawmaker. More concretely, members on the House Committee on Natural Resources may value certain environmental policies
so strongly that they discount too heavily the values of a more robust
system of federalism. If they can more easily enact certain policies by
passing the responsibility for funding them to states and localities,
they will do so even when that funding decision is inefficient, not in
the best interest of a federal system, or both.
UMRA constrains congressional committees in several ways. First,
it vests the power of identifying intergovernmental mandates and
determining their direct costs in the CBO, a centralized entity that has
stronger ties to congressional party leaders and the budget committees than to the authorization committees.1 2 2 The data on intergovernmental mandates that the CBO provides is crucial under the
framework because the availability of some points of order on the
floor depends on whether direct costs of an unfunded mandate
exceed a statutory threshold. Because there is substantial discretion
in how one interprets and gathers the data, a self-interested committee could manipulate a cost statement to avoid triggering further
enforcement. The CBO, on the other hand, is more responsive to the
congressional leadership and the body as a whole. Moreover, CBO
directors and staff have zealously protected their reputations as nonpartisan, professional experts who produce credible information. The
well-respected chief of the State and Local Government Cost Estimates Unit, Theresa Gullo, has held that position since the enactment
of UMRA, serving throughout several changes in the partisan control
122 See Comm. on Fed. Legislation, supra note 109, at 685 (finding this to be problematic because it "gives enormous discretion to the ... CBO, which will provide the
fiscal data that supports or refutes a challenge to a mandate").
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of Congress. 123 Certainly, the CBO faces some political pressuresand a CBO Director appointed by Republicans is likely to have different views and reach different conclusions on some issues than a CBO
Director appointed by Democrats-but he and his staff may well be
seen as a more faithful agent of the average legislator than committees when it comes to unfunded mandates.
The power taken from committees has gone to other congres124
sional players-in this case, individual members and party leaders.
The ability to object to consideration of unfunded mandates on the
floor of both houses tends to shift control to individual members of
Congress, at least those who can command majority support or-for a
short time-support of forty others in the Senate. 125 The point of
order allows members to unravel deals struck in committee, and in
the House it undermines the ability of the Rules Committee to further
protect such deals through special rules limiting amendments or waiving points of order. This again can be seen as an indication that the
full body had lost some trust in its agents, the committees. In David
Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran's study of delegation, they identify the
use of restrictive rules as a measure of trust in the committee to produce proposals that will reflect the floor's preferences. 126 In other
words, the floor will not demand to be as active in crafting a proposal,
and will accept more restrictive rules, if it can trust that the committee's output will not diverge substantially from the preference of the
median legislator.

123

Most CBO staff like Gullo are professionals who remain in their positions, not-

withstanding partisan shifts in Congress; she began working at the CBO as a federal
budget analyst in 1985 and has been the chief of the State and Local Government
Cost Estimates Unit for the entire period that UMRA has been effective. The CBO
Director is appointed for a four-year term, 2 U.S.C. § 601(a)(1)-(3) (2000), so he is
also somewhat insulated from partisan politics; since the creation of the CBO in the
mid-1970s, CBO Directors have worked to avoid being identified as part of partisan
politics. Cf Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, InstitutionalDesign of a Thayerian
Congress, 51 DuKE L.J. 1277, 1315 & nn.119-20 (2001) (noting the benefits of, and
difficulties sometimes occasioned for politicians by, the nonpartisan nature of the
CBO directorship).
124 For a discussion of the shift in power away from committees generally, see
DAVID W. ROHDE, PARTIES AND LEADERS IN THE POSTREFORM HousE (1991).

125

126

See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS 182-83 (1999);

see also Garrett, supra note 8, at 759-62 (discussing similar uses of frameworks to

remove power from committees that other legislators no longer trusted as faithful
agents).
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The amount of power shifted to party leaders by UMRA differs
according to the context.1 2 7 To the extent that committee chairs can
otherwise establish independent power bases, 128 a framework like
UMRA that empowers centralized entities tends to work to the advantage of party leaders. However, the House Rules Committee has long
been closely associated with party leaders, so the weakening of its control over House floor deliberations may also reduce the power of
those leaders. Typically, parliamentary devices such as points of order
have been mechanisms to strengthen the control of party leaders over
the floor because the meaning of procedural votes is often relatively
opaque to constituents.1 29 Thus, leaders can call on party loyalty to
gain support on procedural votes when members might not support
them on a vote on final passage. In contrast 'to other procedural
1 30
devices, such as some of the very obscure budget points of order,
UMRA points of order are much more straightforward, and the
groups that care about unfunded mandates-members of the intergovernmental lobby-are relatively sophisticated observers of the legislative process. So it seems unlikely that UMRA procedures can be
used to hide decisions from voters in the same way that other procedures can.
Finally, the effect on the power of party leaders depends on the
way in which a point of order is raised. When raised to strike an
unfunded mandate that is part of a larger bill negotiated by party and
committee leaders as a comprehensive package designed to attract
majority support (or supermajority support to survive a filibuster in
the Senate), then the objection is contrary to the interests of leadership. On the other hand, the Senate's temporarily strengthened point
of order was used to defeat attempts to add nongermane provisions to
appropriations bills on the floor of Congress. In such cases, the ability
to rule such amendments out of order with only forty-one votes
allowed party and committee leaders more control over the fate of
their legislative product once it reached the Senate floor, where non127

Cf Mathew D. McCubbins, The Legislative Process, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA

OF DEM-

403-08 (Paul Barry Clarke &Joe Foweraker eds., 2001) (noting
that procedures delegate power to allow the front-bench and back-bench to check
each other); McNollgast, supra note 119, at 1685 (describing how procedures provide
checks and balances among players in Congress, including party leaders, committee
chairs, and members).
128 With the weakening of seniority as the primary basis for appointing committee
chairs in the last decades, the power of the chair that is independent from the party
leadership has also weakened. See Cox & MCCUBBINS, supra note 121, at 52-54.
OCRATIc THOUGHT

129

See GARY W. COX &

MATHEW

D.

MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA

29 (2005).

130 See Dauster, supra note 54, at 30-34 (describing the particularly convoluted
Byrd Rule in the reconciliation process).
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germane amendments can typically be considered and adopted. Senators have long used nongermane amendments to bring issues to the
floor that committees have blocked or leaders have refused to schedule for deliberation. 13' Thus, any parliamentary device that can allow
leadership to more easily defeat such attempts increases its power.
To conclude, UMRA has clearly resulted in some changes in the
balance of power in both bodies. Committees have lost power with
respect to unfunded intergovernmental mandates. On balance, party
leaders have probably gained some power, but not as much as they
have under other frameworks, such as, for example, the congressional
budget process. Individual members have more power to play a
meaningful role in floor deliberations, although in the House they
can succeed in challenging unfunded mandates only if they have the
support of a majority. In the Senate, determined minorities could
block consideration of unfunded mandates for a short period of
enhanced procedures, but the result of the process in this body is
more mixed. Leaders could also use the supermajority vote requirement when it was in effect to keep members from adding nongermane unfunded mandates to appropriations and other important
bills, even if those amendments could garner majority support.
III.

CHALLENGES FOR FEDERALISM FRAMEWORKS

This exploration of UMRA has provided insight into framework
laws generally by providing a concrete example that can illustrate
some of the purposes such laws serve. It has also filled out the picture
of the "finely wrought" and "considered" (even if not always exhaustively so) procedures that a statute in this arena must travel. Unlike
the constitutional provisions that Professor Clark extols, UMRA is
targeted to make more arduous the path of enacting certain laws that
pose a particular threat to federalism. We are left with at least two
questions. First, why limit the procedural obstacles contained in
UMRA only to unfunded intergovernmental mandates and not other
types of laws that implicate federalism? The possibility of broader coverage for a framework turns in large part on whether lawmakers could
describe the set of bills that would trigger the framework before they
know the precise details of the proposals that should be subject to the
rules. Second, should courts enforce procedural frameworks like
UMRA in the same way that Clark encourages them to do with respect
to constitutional separation of powers? The enactors of UMRA not
131 See MARTIN B. GOLD, SENATE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 104-08 (2004) (describing how nongermane floor amendments are a route around committees and leadership to bring issues directly to the floor).
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only assumed that judicial enforcement of the legislative provisions
would be inappropriate, but they explicitly provided for judicial
review only of violations of Title II's regulatory provisions.1 3 2 Others
have argued that more aggressive judicial review of internal rules,
1 33
even those passed as statutes, implicates constitutional concerns.
From my perspective, one important problem with limited judicial
review is that it would make Congress less likely to adopt frameworks
in the first place, denying the legislature the ability to use frameworks
to achieve worthwhile purposes. One solution is to allow Congress to
opt in to judicial review with an explicit provision in a framework law,
an option I expect Congress to exercise very rarely and which would
squarely present the constitutional questions raised by judicial involvement in the enforcement of internal legislative rules.
A.

Identifying the Scope of Coverage for FederalismFrameworks

One necessary condition for Congress to address a problem
through a framework law is that lawmakers must be able to identify a
relatively concrete problem and then describe it with enough specificity so that the framework can be triggered in the right circumstances.13 4 This specification has to occur when the framework is
passed and before lawmakers are sure which bills may fall within its
scope in the future. This condition for frameworks is particularly
important with respect to rules entrenching particular outcomes that
are less likely to occur in the absence of a framework. Take UMRA as
an example. The concern, as we saw above, is that Congress will systematically enact more unfunded mandates than is socially optimal
because of a fiscal illusion. UMRA is therefore triggered whenever
there is a significant unfunded intergovernmental mandate, and its
procedures make it harder for lawmakers to pass such a mandate. If
Congress had to decide to apply more onerous procedures on a billby-bill basis, then lawmakers, tempted by the allure of shifting the
funding for a particular policy to states and localities, would be
unlikely to agree to the enhanced procedures. The more information
lawmakers have about the particular bill, often the less likely they will
be to apply additional procedures. So it is important to put a framework law into effect that will apply to future decisions before
lawmakers have a clear idea which policies they support may be
132 2 U.S.C. § 1571 (2000).
133 See, e.g., Bruhl, supra note 11, at 372-413; Michael B. Miller, TheJusticiability of
Legislative Rules and the "Political"Political Question Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1341,
1357-63 (1990).
134 See Garrett, Conditions, supra note 10, at 296.
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stymied by the framework. In short, they must operate behind a partial veil of ignorance.

13 5

Of course, this reality presents a challenge for drafters of
frameworks. They have to be able to describe generally the set of bills
that they want to fall within the scope of the framework before they
have a detailed knowledge of those particular proposals. Thus, they
need some information about the problem they are targeting, but not
so much that self-interest stands in the way of formulating an effective
framework. Adrian Vermeule terms this the information-neutrality
tradeoff. 136 To succeed as a precommitment device, drafters of a
framework must have sufficient information about the problem, the
contexts in which it is likely to develop, and the behavior that may be
used to evade the framework so that they can craft a sufficiently precise description of its coverage. One challenge for frameworks in the
context of federalism is to define the scope of the framework with
enough specificity so that it includes all the proposals likely to be
problematic. A framework that purports to apply to all laws "implicating federalism" or some other vague phrase would be unworkable.
UMRA targeted one group of bills likely to be especially threatening
to the principles of federalism-unfunded intergovernmental mandates-but it leaves unaffected arenas with significant implications for
the federal system and that could be defined with sufficient precision,
like laws using conditions of federal assistance to produce certain outcomes in states, or laws preempting state or local regulation that do
not already trigger the provisions of UMRA. 137 Let us look at each of
these possible framework laws.
UMRA's coverage has been criticized as too limited even to effectively deal with the problem it purports to attack: federal laws that
shift significant direct costs to states and localities. 3 8 The largest gap
in this respect identified by critics is the failure to cover laws imposing
135 This concept is derived from JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-23 (rev.
ed. 1999). It is an important aspect of Elster's analysis of constitutions as commitment devices. SeeJON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 130-33 (2000). The partial veil of
ignorance idea has been developed in other contexts by legal scholars. See, e.g.,
Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence in
Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 917, 965-77 (1990); Adrian Vermeule, Veil of
Ignorance Rules in ConstitutionalLaw, 111 YALE L.J. 399 (2001). I also discuss it in the
context of frameworks providing neutral rules for certain decisions. See Garrett, supra
note 8, at 736-41.
136 See Vermeule, supra note 135, at 428-29.
137 For example, preemption of state taxing authority might trigger UMRA; preemption of state laws regulating women's reproductive freedom will not. Both have
implications for federalism.
138 See Garrett, supra note 41, at 1138.
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requirements on states as conditions of federal assistance. 139 It is not
clear that conditions of assistance present as serious a problem for
federalism as unfunded intergovernmental mandates because they are
accompanied by at least some federal funding, albeit perhaps not sufficient to defray all the costs imposed on subnational governments.
Nonetheless, using conditional assistance to effect policy will not be as
tempting to federal lawmakers as unfunded mandates because they
must come up with at least some of the money for the policy. Some
also argue that conditional assistance is not as problematic because
states can always avoid the conditions by turning down the money, but
this argument is not compelling.1 40 Walking away from federal funding because of onerous conditions is not a realistic option for many
states, which need the funds for their schools, infrastructure, home1 41
land security, and other purposes.
One federalism framework proposed after the enactment of
UMRA, the Federalism Act of 1999, targeted only a subset of conditions: "any provision that establishes a condition for receipt of funds
under the program that is not related to the purposes of the program. ' '142 The Federalism Act thus targeted so-called "crossover sanctions," but it did not include in its coverage a second set of conditions
often equated with mandates: "crosscutting requirements" that apply
"generally applicable requirements across the board to further various
national social and economic policies. '14-3 Presumably, however, Congress could draft a framework that applied to both sets of conditions if
it wanted to. Such a framework could be crafted using UMRA as a
model; it could require information about the various types of conditions and identification of any funding provided to offset the costs.
Enforcement could be provided by points of order. A member could
raise an objection if the bill was not accompanied by a statement
about the conditions of assistance when it came to the floor, and a
different objection could be raised if the statement indicated the condition was not sufficiently funded by the federal assistance provided in
139 See, e.g., GAO, COVERAGE, supra note 17, at 22-25; Gullo, supra note 63, at
568-69.
140 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
141 See Garrett, supra note 41, at 1127.
142 See Federalism Act of 1999, H.R. 2245, 106th Cong. § 8(b)(2) (1999). The
Senate companion bill was called the Federalism Accountability Act of 1999, S. 1214,
106th Cong. (1999).
143 See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REGULATORY FEDERALISM 7-10 (1984), available at http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/Reports/brief/
B-7.pdf; see also Michael Fix & Daphne A. Kenyon, Introduction to COPING WITH MANDATES, supra note 87, at 1, 3-4 (describing both crossover sanctions and crosscutting
requirements).

1528

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 83:4

the bill. Waiver of the points of order could occur by majority or
supermajority votes.
Another set of legislation is often viewed as particularly problematic for a robust system of federalism: federal laws that preempt state
laws. Again, a framework could be crafted to cover these laws because
this is a specifically concrete problem to lend itself to ex ante specification; indeed, the proposed Federalism Act would have adopted special procedures for bills that preempt state or local government
authority. Under the provisions of that proposal, committees, including conference committees, would have to identify any provision in a
legislative proposal that preempted state or local government regulation. 14 4 Then the CBO Director would be required to prepare a federalism impact assessment that would describe the preemptive effect
of the law and any costs imposed on subnational governments. 145 The
committee report would include this assessment, as well as identify
preemptions and provide a constitutional basis and justification for
14 6
each preemption.
The challenge with this sort of framework is enforcement.
Although the parameters of the doctrine are subject to disagreement,
preemption is a definite enough concept that the scope of the framework law can be described sufficiently before any particular law is
under consideration. But what happens if Congress simply does not
identify the preemption and enacts the law anyway? Maybe someone
will object, and the objection will be waived, or maybe no one will
object. Interestingly, in either case courts might provide the discipline. With a legislative framework in place designed to specifically
identify and provide information about the existence and extent of a
preemption, courts could more appropriately apply rules of statutory
construction that require express preemption before interpreting a
federal law to preempt state law. 147 In other words, if the text is
144 H.R. 2245 § 8(b)(1).
145 Id. § 8(b) (2). it is not clear that the CBO or the committee itself is the best
entity to describe the preemption and its constitutional basis, although certainly the
CBO is the right entity to provide cost estimates. In earlier work, Adrian Vermeule
and I have suggested a framework law to deal with constitutional issues implicated by
legislation and described a specialized staff that might provide expertise in analyzing
bills. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 123, at 1317-19 (proposing an Office for
Constitutional Issues).
146 H.R. 2245 § 8(b)(2).
147 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17 (2007) (arguing in favor of a clear

statement of express preemption because it would better ensure congressional attention to-and vigorous debate of-issues involving state regulation, and describing the
current state of the jurisprudence as inconsistent).

2008]

FRAMEWORK

LEGISLATION

AND

FEDERALISM

1529

ambiguous and there is no identification of the preemption in a committee report and accompanying federalism impact statement provided before floor deliberation, then the court could refuse to find
any preemption and construe the provision in favor of state authority.
Similarly, an agency interpreting the statute as it promulgates regulations would not preempt state or local regulation unless Congress had
expressly provided for such a preemption. 48 The Federalism Act
took this approach by enacting special rules of construction relating
to preemption and prohibiting interpreters from finding a preemption unless it was expressly set forth in the statute or the federal statute directly conflicted with a state law in such a way that the two
"cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together."' 49 Although
the Federalism Act limited the search for preemption to the text, the
framework law could instruct courts to search both the text and certain kinds of legislative history, such as the federalism impact
assessment.
This kind of framework involves the judicial branch in enforcement by mandating certain canons of construction and thereby affecting how statutes that fall within the scope of the framework are
interpreted. It can rely on clear statement rules and other techniques
of statutory interpretation to help ensure that Congress focuses on the
particular issue and addresses it expressly and clearly in the text and
an accompanying federalism statement. In that way, the framework
makes even more salient an issue that some courts have tried to bring
150
to Congress' attention through the use of clear statement rules.
Also, to the extent that the framework itself directs courts to apply
clear statement rules, as the Federalism Act did, it reduces the chance
that judges and courts will adopt different interpretive strategies,
thereby diluting the disciplining effect of any clear statement rule.
148

For a discussion of the current interpretive practice relating to agencies and

preemption, see Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REv. 737,

743-55 (2004); Elizabeth Garrett, Step One of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 55,
73-75 (John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005) (discussing the use of clear statement rules in judicial review of agency interpretations).
149 H.R. 2245 § 9(a), see also Anita S. Krishnakumar, RepresentationReinforcement: A
Legislative Solution to a Legislative Process Problem 43-46 (St. John's Univ. Sch. Of Law
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-0079, 2007), available at http://
SSRN.com/abstract=1009230 (proposing a framework law enforced in part through
judicial use of clear statement rules in statutory interpretation).
150 See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) ("In traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear
statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into
issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision.").
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But this type of judicial enforcement does not require that courts get
into the business of enforcing Congress' own internal rules. That is
the second challenge to which we now turn.
B. JudicialEnforcement of Framework Laws

When frameworks such as UMRA are enacted as a statute, Congress is usually careful to state explicitly that each house is exercising
its authority under the Constitution to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings. 1 51 This disclaimer clause in a framework statute will
emphasize the "full recognition of the constitutional right of either
House to change such rules (as far as relating to such House) at any
time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in any case of any
other rule of each House."1 52 In the Senate, once the framework law
is enacted, it remains in place until it expires according to any sunset
provisions in the law or until the Senate changes or repeals it (presumably in either a statute or a simple resolution). In this way, a
framework law is no different than the Standing Rules of the Senate,
which remain in effect from session to session because the Senate is a
continuing body.'153 The House adopts its rules at the beginning of
each new session, 154 and it treats framework laws as it does other internal rules, clarifying in the resolution putting House rules in place that
rules contained in previously enacted framework laws are
readopted.
151
152

155

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995 § 108, 2 U.S.C. § 1515 (2000).

153 Some have argued that this feature of Senate rules is unconstitutional because
it allows past Senates to impermissibly bind future ones, particularly because amendments to the Senate rules can be filibustered and require a two-thirds vote for cloture.
See, e.g., John C. Roberts, Majority Voting in Congress:FurtherNotes on the Constitutionality
of the Senate Cloture Rule, 20J.L. & POL. 505, 520-38 (2004) (concluding first that any
rule can be changed by majority vote). Nonetheless, whatever the validity of the reason, Senate rules are not readopted each session, in contrast to the House. See id. at

511-12. Moreover, the Senate's recent decision to depart from the supermajority voting requirement with respect to UMRA points of order and return to a simple majority vote occurred in the context of a legislative vehicle that cannot be filibustered, the
concurrent budget resolution. See supra note 49.

154 Although this provides the House an opportunity for substantial revision of the
rules every two years, the changes are largely incremental, and the basic structure of
the House rules has been largely unchanged since the adoption of the so-called

Reed's rules in the 1880s. See Cox & MCCUBBINS, supra note 129, at 75-76. This
suggests that procedures enacted through internal resolutions are relatively durable
even though not adopted as statutes.
155 See, e.g., H.R. Res. 5, 108th Cong. § 1 (2003) (readopting "applicable provisions of law... that constituted rules of the House at the end of the One Hundred
Seventh Congress").
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Congress clearly does not envision that rules it enacts as part of a
statute will be the subject of any sort ofjudicial review. In the description of the conference report on UMRA, Senator Kempthorne stated
confidently, in describing the judicial review section of Title IV: "Title
I deals with the requirements of Congress, and judicial review is not
appropriate for the internal actions of Congress.

' 15 6

Part of the rea-

son for the absence ofjudicial review is that internal rules of Congress
do not have legal force and effect, a fact that is clearly evident when
they are passed through simple or concurrent resolutions, which do
not meet the constitutional requirements for lawmaking. In INS v.
Chadha,157 the Court noted that exercise of the rulemaking authority
is an exception to the requirements of bicameralism and presentment
because it "only empowers Congress to bind itself and is noteworthy
only insofar as it further indicates the Framers' intent that Congress
not act in any legally binding manner outside a closely circumscribed
15 8
legislative arena, except in specific and enumerated instances."
The proposition that internal rules are not statutes even if contained in framework legislation does not entirely answer the question
of whether courts have an appropriate role to play in their enforcement. First, if Congress were to adopt a rule that violated another
constitutional provision, including those setting out certain procedures to govern the legislative branch, judicial review might well be
appropriate. 159 But the issue here is different from a question of
whether the framework law itself is constitutional. 160 The issue is
whether a court should entertain the argument that Congress did not
comply with its own rules when it debated and enacted a particular
law, with a possible remedy of voiding the law entirely. 16 1 Further,
156
157
158
159

141 CONG. Rxc. 7747 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kempthorne).
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
Id. at 956 n.21.
See Miller, supra note 133, at 1348-51.

160 There might be an argument that any supermajority votes to waive a point of
order violate the Constitution, which arguably requires only majority votes to pass
legislation in the absence of a specific constitutional mandate otherwise. See generally
Bruce Ackerman et al., An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104

YALE

L.J. 1539

(1995) (arguing against the constitutionality of an internal House rule requiring a
three-fifths vote to pass tax increases). But seeJohn 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionalityof Legislative SupermajorityRequirements: A Defense, 105 YALE
L.J. 483 (1995) (defending the rule's constitutionality). For further discussion, see

Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that members of Congress
did not have the ability to challenge the House rules in Court).
161 The appropriate remedy in such a case is unclear. Perhaps the court would
merely strike the provision that violated the framework rule. On the other hand, a
court could not be certain that the law would have passed without that particular
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does one's view of the right answer to that question change if the rule
was passed as part of a statute, with the participation of the other
house and the President? 162 I am not interested here in the descriptive aspects of this question, i.e., whether the courts would intervene
under current jurisprudence. There, it is fair to say thatjudicial intervention is unlikely, with at least one court declining to enforce a congressional rule enacted in a statute as a nonjusticiable political
question 63 and a recent appellate decision applying a fairly strong
version of the enrolled bill doctrine to refuse to determine whether
the same version of a law passed both houses of Congress before one
version was enrolled and submitted to the President. 16 4 However,
Supreme Court precedent is somewhat murky and difficult to reconcile, 165 and it is made even more challenging because of the cutback
in legislator standing. 166 Instead, I will address some of the normative
issues raised by the possibility of judicial review of Congress' compliance with framework legislation.
In his influential article Due Process of Lawmaking, Judge Hans
Linde argues that review of legislation pursuant to the Due Process
Clause should primarily involve review of the process the legislature
followed in enacting the law. 16 7 Some of those procedures, including
the ones emphasized by Professor Clark in his work, are constitutionprovision, so it could be argued that the entire statute would be void. These are the
same questions analyzed in cases involving severance of one provision of a law found
unconstitutional from the rest of the law, or in state cases involving single-subject
rules for legislation. See ESKRIDGE, FmcKEY & GAuTrr, supra note 50, at 357-65 (discussing single-subject rules).
162 See, e.g.,
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, If the JudicialConfirmation Process Is Broken, Can
a Statute Fix It?, 85 NEB. L. REv. 960, 973-76 (2007).
163 Metzenbaum v. FERC, 675 F.2d 1282, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
164 Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1349-55 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(applying the enrolled bill rule of Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), and dismissing a
challenge to the Deficit Reduction Act).
165 Compare Field, 143 U.S. at 672 (holding that the signing of an enrolled bill by
the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate functions as an official
attestation that the bill is the one that actually passed Congress, and the "respect due
to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act
upon that assurance"), with United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 391 (1990)
(rejecting a claim that invalidating a statute on Origination Clause grounds would
evince a lack of respect for the determinations of the House).
166 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829-30 (1997). For a discussion of standing
and other issues of justiciability in the context of framework legislation, see AaronAndrew P. Bruhl, Return of the Line Item Veto? Legalities, Practicalities,and Some Puzzles,
10 U. PA.J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 45-58), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=999644.
167 See Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 245 (1976).
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ally mandated, but others are internal rules adopted by the houses
themselves and changed over time to reflect experience and new circumstances. As Linde describes them,
[T]he process everywhere is governed by rules, and these rules are
purposefully made and from time to time changed and.., most of
them are sufficiently concrete so that participants and observers
alike will recognize when a legislative body is following the due pro168
cess of lawmaking and when it is not.

Linde argues that compliance with these rules should be the subject ofjudicial review, notjust internal enforcement, because they are
crucial to the legitimacy of the laws and to the assurance that the legislature will act consistently with due process guarantees. 169 Although
Linde does not specifically address statutized rules, he does note that
important rule changes were adopted as part of the Legislative Reorganization Acts of 1946170 and 1970,171 which contained provisions
adopting internal rules for both houses as part of comprehensive

statutes. 172
Framework laws are important structures for the due process of
lawmaking because they often serve purposes related to improving the
deliberative process-solving coordination problems, entrenching
important values that are apt to be overlooked because of decisionmaking pathologies in a collective body, or providing neutral rules for
decisions in the future that will be highly charged. Third-party
enforcement of some sort might be particularly important with
respect to the last two purposes-entrenchment and neutralitybecause many lawmakers will be tempted to evade the procedures
when their immediate interests in passing legislation outweigh their
longer-term interest in the value that they sought to entrench. In the
circumstances of federalism, a framework law like UMRA is justified in
part because it constrains lawmakers from enacting substantial
unfunded mandates in order to establish policies their constituents
want while avoiding responsibility for funding those programs. Given
the temptation to enact unfunded mandates in particular cases, legislators will try to avoid the bite of the disciplining framework; enforcement by the judicial branch could provide more teeth. Thus, due
168
169
170
171

Id. at 242.
See id. at 242-43.
Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812.
Pub. L. No. 91-510, 84 Stat. 1140.

172 See Garrett, Conditions, supra note 10, at 294, 296 (relating these Acts to framework laws).
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process of lawmaking seems to point strongly in favor of greater judicial involvement with respect to framework laws.
If, however, courts began to enforce some of the internal congressional rules using a due process of lawmaking rationale, several
problems would arise. 173 First, and most important, outside enforcement would be a strong deterrent to adoption of the frameworks in
the first place. Although the effect of frameworks is not illusory, it is
certainly true that lawmakers are more willing to put a framework in
place because they understand that internal rules are less durable
than other kinds of rules-statutory or constitutional. How Congress
would react to increased judicial scrutiny depends on how far-reaching that scrutiny would be. If courts began to be more involved in
ensuring compliance with any internal congressional rule-whether
passed as a statute or through a wholly internal process-then Congress would presumably continue to use frameworks. In that case, just
as now, nothing would be different depending on the form of rule
adoption. However, it seems more likely that any increase in judicial
review would be focused not on rules adopted in purely internal vehicles, but only on framework laws which have already involved another
branch of government-the President-in their adoption. In that
case, legislators might work to avoid using framework laws as much as
possible, coordinating passage of multiple parts of a package in other
ways. Judicial review will have only made it more difficult for Congress
to achieve what it wants in the way that it wants without any corresponding increase in judicial review (as Congress circumvents the
courts by eschewing the framework law format).
Thus, a uniform rule that courts will enforce framework laws is
undesirable, but perhaps it would be attractive to lawmakers to have a
choice: an option of a structure that provides for outside enforcement, and an option to continue with only internal disciplinary
devices. Lawmakers could then decide what level of accountability
they wanted to offer their constituents in designing the framework
law. 17 4 Here, the key question is how can lawmakers reliably signal to
courts that they want judicial review as an additional enforcement
mechanism in some cases but not in others? Some courts might interpret the choice of the statutory form for adoption of internal rules as
173 Such enforcement would presumably come usually when a private party would
challenge the validity of a law on the ground that Congress did not follow the relevant
rules when it enacted the law. It would be harder to envision a challenge on the
ground that a law that should have been enacted was not because of improper appli-

cation of some rule, particularly given the stringent limitations on lawmaker standing.
174 Cf Ferejohn, supra note 84, at 136-49 (describing the accountability-discretion
tradeoff that lawmaker-agents consider).
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the signal to encourage judicial intervention. That would be a mistake, not just because the statutes usually contain a disclaimer
clause,1 75 but also because legislators primarily use the statutory form
not to signal their desire for increased durability but to satisfy a need
to enact all packages of a comprehensive reform in one legislative
vehicle. 1 76 Moreover, the absence of a disclaimer clause in a framework law should not be understood as a signal welcoming judicial
review; it is more likely an oversight. Indeed, the disclaimer clause

itself is typically phrased as a recognition of the principle that provisions in a statute affecting only the internal rules of one or both
houses is an exercise of the rulemaking power and can be changed
unilaterally and at any time by the relevant body. 177 In other words,
the disclaimer provision is not the same as a reserve clause; it is
instead a statement of the default rule for statutized and other internal rules.
I would propose, instead, a regime which allows Congress to
explicitly opt in to judicial review of compliance with framework laws.
Without an explicit provision in the text describing the scope of judicial review, the default should remain that courts are only minimally
involved in cases involving internal rules. Otherwise, Congress is
likely to retreat from framework laws entirely, using internal rules
coordinated, if necessary, with statutory proposals enacting comprehensive reform. This consequence would be a negative development
for the due process of lawmaking, without any corresponding
advantages.
Of course, Congress will seldom, if ever, invite judicial enforcement. An express request for enforcement by third parties outside
congressional control 1 7 8 is more likely for frameworks that are not apt

to be triggered during the political tenure of the enactors. Most
frameworks, however, will influence decisionmaking in the short term,
often within the same Congress that adopted it. Perhaps an issue will
become so politically salient to voters that they will demand some
credible signal of durability, beyond enactment as a statute, and in
175 See supra text accompanying notes 151-52.
176 See Garrett, Conditions, supra note 10, at 312-17.
177 See Bruhl, supra note 11, at 364-65.
178 Such third parties include courts and executive branch enforcers; Congress is
more willing to allow enforcement by entities it has more direct influence over, such
as the CBO or the Joint Committee on Taxation. For example, Congress attempted
to vest sequestration, the most stringent enforcement of the budget process, in the
GAO, and only switched that enforcement to the Office of Management and Budget
when the Supreme Court ruled the delegation to the GAO unconstitutional. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986).
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those cases Congress may decide to opt in to a system of judicial
review. If this occurs, courts will be forced to face squarely the question of whether judicial review of a statutized rule is constitutional.
The question will be framed differently than it has been in prior cases
because the statute itself will indicate that Congress has asked for such
third-party enforcement. Others have argued that judicial enforcement of internal rules, even those in statutes, would be unconstitutional, 179 although few have considered the possibility (perhaps
because it is so unlikely) that review would be explicitly provided
for.180 Case law is unclear whether the outcome of this constitutional
question would turn on whether Congress has given away some of its
power to another branch, rather than tried to usurp the prerogatives
of the executive or judicial branch.' 8 1
I leave the constitutional questions posed by judicial review of
framework laws that expressly contemplate such review to others.
From my perspective, the more interesting question is a practical one:
could a court determine in many cases whether the rule had been
followed or whether Congress had decided to waive or repeal the rule
before enacting the statute? There would be many stages in the legislative process that a court would need to assess to reach an answer to
that question. As we have seen, each house could repeal or modify a
rule first adopted through a framework law through an internal resolution. Many points of order, although not those related to UMRA,
182
are waived as a group in a special rule governing a particular bill.
All these sources would have to be consulted to determine whether
179 See, e.g., Bruhl, supra note 11, at 404-15; see also Miller, supranote 133, at 1364,
1374 (determining thatjudicial review would be constitutional, but that courts should
decline to review because compliance with procedural rules is a political question that
courts should refrain from deciding).
180 For an exception, see Bruhl, supra note 166 (manuscript at 47-53) (describing
possible ways around current standing doctrine that seems to stand in the way of
judicial review of one framework law, the Line Item Veto Act).
181 Compare Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 447-49 (1998) (holding the
Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional because of its failure to comply with the Constitution's bicameralism and presentment requirements, even though Congress had augmented the President's power), with Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732-34 (holding Congress'
retention of removal power over the Comptroller General to intrude unconstitutionally into the President's power to execute the laws), and INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
951-59 (1983) (holding the one-house veto unconstitutional because among other
things, it was an exercise of legislative power at the expense of the President's veto

power).
182 See, e.g., Metzenbaum v. FERC, 675 F.2d 1282, 1285-86 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(describing an example of a waivable point of order in the Alaskan Natural Gas Transportation Act); see also id. at 1287-88 (holding the issue nonjusticiable, but also suggesting that any objection had been waived in a special rule).
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Congress had violated a rule or decided, as it has the power to do, to
waive it through the appropriate procedure. Those procedures would
not be uniform across all framework legislation. Some objections in
the House can be waived in special rules, some cannot; some require a
supermajority vote to waive in the Senate, some can be waived by a
simple majority vote.
After consulting all these sources, the court's role, if such a role is
constitutional, would be to ensure compliance, but this task is also
fraught with difficulty.' 8 3 If both houses waived the rule in the manner provided for in the rules, then there is no rule to enforce. Provisions in framework laws do not require that waiver be justified in any
particular way; they allow Congress to waive the objection and continue to consider the bill as long as the procedure, including any
supermajority voting requirement, is followed. One danger of inviting
judicial review of compliance with internal rules is that a court may
impose some burden of reasonable explanation for a waiver. 184 Such
a requirement would be inconsistent with point-of-order enforcement,
which typically does not provide for much debate of the parliamentary
objection. It might also be inconsistent with the purpose behind
framework laws, such as UMRA, where Congress has determined that
it does not want to prohibit enactment of unfunded mandates
entirely, but it does want to allow a member the ability to disaggregate
substantial mandates and force Congress, by majority or
supermajority, to agree to impose them. In that way, the law ensures
that lawmakers at least know of the provision, which may be buried in
a complex omnibus bill, and can be held accountable by voters and
interest groups for burdening the states and localities.
Other cases would involve a challenge to a law enacted by Congress on the ground that no objection was raised even though the law
contained a provision subject to a point of order. Sometimes that
183

Cf Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121

HARV. L. REv. 543, 579-80 (2007) (contrastingjudicial review of timing rules with the

review of other internal rules because the former are relatively straightforward).
184 In other contexts, the Supreme Court has reviewed the state of the legislative
record to determine if the empirical basis on which Congress legislated was sufficient.
See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) (concerning the American with Disabilities Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 635
(2000) (concerning the Violence Against Women Act); see also Ruth Colker &JamesJ.
Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 83 (2001) (describing the Court's
scrutiny of the legislative record as "undermin[ing] Congress's ability to decide for
itself how and whether to make a record in support of pending legislation"); Philip P.
Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism
Cases: An Interdisciplinay Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1733-37 (2002) (exploring the
complexity of defining the legislative record).
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inquiry would be straightforward. To consider an example from
UMRA, if the CBO statement identified an unfunded intergovernmental mandate above the threshold and no lawmaker objected to its
consideration on the floor, then arguably the court can fairly easily
determine that the framework was violated. But what if the challenge
is that the CBO's estimate of the direct costs was too low, so that the
law did not trigger the internal enforcement when it should have?
Can a court appropriately second-guess the budget experts at the
CBO and reevaluate the financial burden placed on subnational governments? Some of the determinations for the budget points of order
are even more complicated, relying not just on complex estimating
techniques but also application of congressional precedents. Not only
does the process sound increasingly constitutionally problematic-as
one branch begins to interfere in the internal operations of another
coordinate branch-but the questions posed are also not those that a
court is particularly competent to decide.
There is an argument, however, that some minimal level of judicial scrutiny might complement the role of the CBO in a framework
law like UMRA.18 5 To the extent that the decisions of an entity like
the CBO play a large role in determining the fate of programs important to legislators, then some political pressure will be brought to bear
on expert staff to tailor their estimates to allow lawmakers to achieve
their objectives. The threat that a faulty CBO analysis might trigger
limited judicial review of the congressional procedure used to pass the
mandate might provide insurance against politicization of its staff and
decisionmaking. Moreover, lawmakers might want to explicitly allow
for the possibility of judicial intervention as a mechanism to bind
themselves from exercising inappropriate political influence over
decisions that voters believe should be made on the basis of expertise.
Under this conception ofjudicial review, courts could be seen as serving a roughly analogous function in reviewing CBO statements in the
course of assessing the congressional procedures used to pass intergovernmental mandates as they do in cases reviewing agency rulemaking under "hard look" review. In these cases, judges require that
agencies explain their regulatory decisions in a rational and logical
way, but they do not necessarily substitute their judgment on the merits for that of the agency.18 6 Similarly, the court would not revisit the
actual computation of the direct costs of an unfunded mandate if a
party claimed the mandate should have triggered UMRA protections,
185 I appreciate Bob Rasmussen's insight on this point.
186 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, JudicialReview of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN.
L. REv. 363, 383 (1986) (describing this sort of "hard look" review of agency policy).
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but it would assess whether the statement was supported by sufficient
explanation. Although the notion of the court as a backstop to somewhat insulate the professional staff of the CBO from inordinate political pressure has some appeal, the experience with hard look review in
administrative law suggests that the judicial intervention would not
remain minimal, and the benefits of the threat ofjudicial review could
be outweighed by the disadvantages of judicial intervention in arenas
where courts have little institutional competence. 8 7 Moreover,
increasing the requirements for the CBO's mandate statements would
be burdensome for the staff dealing with many bills under substantial
time pressure, a problem similar to that of ossification in the agency
context.1 88
CONCLUSION

Thus, whatever one's view of Professor Clark's argument that
courts should aggressively enforce the constitutional provisions governing lawmaking as a way to safeguard federalism, judicial review of
internal rules, including those adopted in statutory form, presents
practical problems and potentially serious constitutional concerns.
Understanding the role of framework laws-both the decade-long
experience with UMRA and the promise of other federalism
frameworks that would make it more difficult for the federal government to preempt state laws or enact significant conditions of assistance unrelated to the purpose of the federal funding-is crucial for a
fully informed view of how lawmaking procedures interact with federalism. But beyond perhaps playing a role in statutory interpretation
techniques as envisioned in the proposed Federalism Act to apply to
federal preemptions, framework legislation should not become an
additional avenue for judicial involvement in this realm.

187 Cf.Frank B. Cross, Shatteringthe Fragile Casefor Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85
L. REv. 1243, 1285-86 (1999) (arguing that "[t]he case for judicial review of

VA.

agency action has ... been a tactic to advance substantive ends").
188 Cf Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L.
REv. 59, 60-62 (1995) (describing the problem of ossification in agency rulemaking).

1540

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL.

83:4

